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THE CHANGE IN THE MEANING OF CONSORTIUM
By EVANs HOLBROOK*
L AWYERS have long boasted of the flexibility of the common
law, of its ability to adapt itself to the needs of changing con-
ditions of society, of its responsiveness to sociological progress.
And while eager reformers have often-and with much reason-
complained that the law is laggard in its response to the needs of
the people, yet it is clear that sooner or later the courts generally
bring themselves into accord with "what is sanctioned by usage, or
held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant public
'opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public wel-
fare."' , This responsiveness to the needs of society, this adaptability
to changing demands, necessarily results in a change in the meaning
and content of legal words and phrases. It is clear that a word,
meaning one certain definite thing in the fourteenth century, will
mean much more in the twentieth century. To quote again from
Mr. Justice Holmes, "A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used."'2 There are of course numerous instances of such
change in the meaning of technical legal terms. It is the purpose of
this paper to trace the change in the meaning and content of the
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
"Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell (i911), 219 U. S.
I04, III.
2 Towne v. Eisner (918), 245 U. S. 418, 425.
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term "consortium"; a term which has been variously defined,3 but
which, in general terms, includes the right of one spouse to the con-
jugal fellowship of the other, to the other's company, co~peration
and aid in the conjugal relation.
4
AT COMMON LAW
Under the common law, a husband's right to the consortium of
his wife was clear and definite. In addition to his complete control
over her property, he was entitled to her custody, her services, and
her conjugal affection;* any interference with those rights, as by
abduction of the wife, by injury to her (either intentional or negli-
gent), or by adultery with her, gave rise to a right of action by-the
husband,6 based on the injury done to "his interest in her."'
As to the corresponding rights of a wife to the consortium of the
husband, there seems to be no authority in the early common law.8
Two reasons are presented as accounting for such absence of
authority on this point: first, that there was no right in the wife
corresponding to that which clearly existed in the husband; second,
that such a right existed, but could not effectively be exercised
because of the procedural difficulties connected with the common
law rules under which a married woman was incapable of suing
except when her husband was joined as plaintiff, and under which
the husband was entitled to the proceeds of any suit brought by
her and him.
Blackstone thus phrases the former of those two views: "We
may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken of
the wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach
and dissolution of either the relation rrself, or at least the advan-
tages accruing therefrom; while the loss of the inferior by such
3 "The right of the husband and wife respectively, to the conjugal fellow-
ship, company, co6peration and aid of the other."--Bouvier.
"The companionship or society of a wife."-Black.
"Conjugal fellowship and assistance."--Anderson.
4 See Bigaouette v. Paulet (i88r), 134 Mass. 123.
5 The third element included, of course, his exclusive right to sexual inter-
course with her.
6 See i Bac. Abr. 5o2 (Baron and Feme) ; 4 id. 552 (Marriage and
Divorce) ; 3 B1. Comm. 139, 140.
7 4 Bac. Abr. 552.
S See 16 Halsbury, Laws of England, 319, note 2.
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injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for which may be this:
that the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or
assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of
the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury."'
The procedural difficulty, arising out of the two common law
rules recited above, would of course be sufficient to account-for the
non-appearance in the reports of any suits brought by a wife to
recover for the loss of her husband's consortium. In suits based
on alienation of his affections or for adultery with him, he would
of course be a wrongdoer along with the defendant, and would profit
by his own wrong if a recovery by the wife were permitted. In
cases based on the wife's damages arising out of an injury to him,
he would of course have his own action against the defendant; it
would be simpler to assess and award to him, in that one action, all
the damages arising from the wrong, rather than to permit two
actions, one by the husband and one by the wife, the proceeds of
both of which would accrue to him under the rule of the common
law which gave him a right to her choses in action.
Inasmuch as this procedural impediment sufficiently accounts for
the absence of common-law authority on this point, it is of course
difficult to argue effectively in favor of the view that the wife actually
had such a right at common law, but that it was held in abeyance
by the procedural impediment.10 There is, however, one fairly cogent
negative argument against the existence of such a right in the wife.
Equity, recognizing the too great rigor of the common law rules
giving the wife's property to the husband, developed a highly effective
method of protecting the wife's property through the creation of the
equitable separate estate. If there had been any definite idea that
the wife's right to consortium was a valid, subsisting right, ineffective
only because of a technicality of legal procedure, it seems likely that
some equitable remedy, such as injunction, might have been used to
93 BI. Comm. 142.
10 There is a frequently quoted dictum of Lord Campbell in favor of the
existence of the wife's right in Lynch v. Knight (iS6i), 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 589.
He says: "Nor can I allow that the loss of consortium, or conjugal society,
can give a cause of action to the husband alone; * * * it may be a loss which
the law may recognize, to the wife as well as to the husband."
The same view is expressed by Mr. Justice Darling in Gray v. Gee (see
note 14, post).
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protect it. But no such case is found until the dawn of the present
century."
The situation at common law is then clear. The husband had
the right to consortium, and could effectively protect it by clearly
defined rights of action; the wife either did not have it or was
denied the right of action to protect it.
AM'rzR TH MARRIED WoMEN'S AcTs
The different Married Women's Acts are almost infinitely vari-
ous in their specific provisions. But they agree in their general pur-
pose to ameliorate the disadvantageous position in which the married
woman was placed by the common law. And generally they achieve
that purpose, with some variations as to effectiveness, by providing
(i) that a wife may hold property as her own, free from control by
her husband, or subject only to a much lessened control by him;
(2) that she may sue without joining him as a plaintiff, and may
hold, as her own property, the proceeds of such suits; (3) that she
is entitled to her own earnings. These three are of course only
different elements of the general emancipation of the wife from the
common law domination by her husband, and are here stated sep-
arately only because one or aftother is frequently relied upon as
being the basis of a change from the common law rules which are
briefly set out above.
One result of the Married Women's Acts was the bringing of
suits to recover for loss of consortium resulting from the defendant's
alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's husband. The right to
bring such a suit is based on the first or the second of the elements
noted above as being characteristic of the Married Women's Acts.
Some courts base it on the theory that a wife's right to consortium
is a property right and that she is now expressly given the right to
hold property; some courts based it on the theory that a wife had
11 Ex parte Warfield (1899), 40 Tex. Crim. 413, and Hall v. Smith (913),
14o N. Y. Supp. 796, recognize the power of a court of equity to enjoin a
defendant from continuing in a course of conduct tending to alienate the affec-
tions of plaintiff's spouse; in the latter case the injunction was refused because
a proper case was not made out.
Judicial intervention in somewhat similar cases was not unknown to the
practitioners of old days; the wife was entitled in the ecclesiastical courts to
a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and equity habitually enjoined-and
punished-interference with its wards. Butler v. Freeman (1756), i Amb. 3o0.
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had the right at common law (though incapable of enforcing it)
and that the statutes empowering her to sue have now removed that
incapacity. 2 At least one court holds that the right existed without
any statutory enactment removing the wife's incapacity to sue, on
the broad ground of equality between husband and wife.
13 A few
courts hold that no right existed at common law, and that none has
:been conferred by the statutes, and thus deny any right to the wife.
Practically every jurisdiction in America, however, now holds that
a wife can sue for the alienation of her husband's affections. It is
interesting to note that while this result was achieved in America
several years ago, it was not until the present year that the wife's
right to maintain this action was established in England. In Gray
v. Gee,'14 Mr. Justice Darling held that such an action would lie,
stating that it was the first such case that had arisen in England.
The courts took the same view of a wife's action in the nature
of crim. con. to recover damages for a defendant's adultery with
the plaintiff's husband. This action has been generally upheld in the
American jurisdictions, 5 though there is more dissent than in the
case of alienation of affections.' 6 The question cannot arise in Eng-
land, as the action for crim. con. was abolished in I857.17 In addi-
tion to recognizing these two rights of action in the wife, the courts
have upheld also her right to sue in other cases where the defendant
had done acts which resulted in the wife's loss of consortium. Thus,
in Flandermeyer v. Cooper,"' the defendant had sold morphine to
plaintiff's husband, with the result that he had become insane and
was confined in an asylum; the court upheld the right of the wife
to sue for loss of consortium. And in Work v. Campbell'9 a defend-
ant who had made wilfully false statements to a wife about her hus-
band, as a result of which she was induced to send him away, and
thus was deprived of his consortium, was held liable to the wife.
' 2 In Eliason v. Draper (910), 25 Del. I, 5-7, many of the cases previous
to the date of the decision are collected and classified.
13 Foot v. Card (1889), 58 Conn. i.
14 Reported in the TIMEs (Weekly Fdition) for May 3, 1923. The verdict
was for the defendant.
15 See Turner v. Heavrin (1918), 182 Ky. 65, in which the cases are col-
lected.
16 See Kroessin v. Keller (I895), 60o Minn. 372 and the cases there cited.
17 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20-21 Vict., Ch. 85), Sec. 59.
Is (i912) 85 Ohio St. 327.
'9 (i912) 164 Calif. 343.
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But while the courts were thus upholding the wife's right to sue
for loss of consortium in such cases, where the act of the defendant
was wilful and intentional, they were unanimously denying it in
cases where the wife's loss of consortium was the result of defend-
ant's negligent injury of the husband. 20  The reason given for this
distinction is usually as follows: in cases of crim. con. and of aliena-
tion of affection, the husband has of course no right of action
against the defendant, as he is a joint wrongdoer with the defendant.
In the case of the negligent injury to the husband, however, he does
have an action against the defendant, and in that action the husband
can recover for his pain and suffering and for his loss of earning
power, by which his ability to support his dependents is lessened.
It is likely, in view of our crude method of trial, that all the dam-
ages arising out of the wrong could be as well assessed and awarded
in one action as in two. As Dean Pound puts it: "If husband and
wife were each allowed to sue, instead of each recovering an exact
reparation, each would be pretty sure to recover what would repair
the injury to both.
21
The enlarged right of the wife under the Married Women's Acts
is therefore pretty clear; she can generally sue for any intentional
injury to the consortium, but cannot sue for a loss of consortium
due to negligence.
How have the husband's rights been affected by such legislation?
His right to his wife's conjugal affection is of course not dimin-
ished by the statutes, and he can accordingly still sue for alienation
of her affections and for crim. con. His right to her earnings is
now taken away by statute, so that in case of an injury to her he
can no longer recover, as he could at common law, for her dimin-
ished earning capacity. He is perhaps2 2 still entitled to her serv-
ices in the household, and can therefore recover for an injury to her
2o Recent cases upholding this denial of the wife's right are: Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co. (I915), 93 Ohio St. iox; Emerson v. Taylor (i9i8), 133
Md. 192; Cravens v. L. & N. R. Co. (1922), 195 Ky. 257. The earlier cases
are collected in a note to Smith v. Nicholas Co., supra, in 14 MICH. L. Rzv. 689.
21 "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," 14 MICH. L. Riv.
'77, '94.
22 Some states seem to allow the wife to recover, in her own suit, for her
diminished capacity to perform work even about the household. Colo. Spgs.
etc., R. Co. v. Nichols (907), 41 Colo. 272; Glanville v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
(i923), - Iowa -, 193 N. W. 548.
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ability to perform such services. 2 3 And of course, as he is bound to
furnish necessaries to her, he can recover, from a defendant who
has injured her, the cost of medical attention, etc. But is there any-
thing else for which he may recover? At common law he certainly
could recover for the loss of her society, her "company, cotperation
and aid," if she were so severely injured that there was a loss of
these features of the consortium. Does this right still survive to
the husband, in spite of its diminution by the statute? Clearly, the
great weight of authority is that it does survive," but there is a
respectable-and increasing-number of jurisdictions holding that
after the husband's right to services is abolished by the statute there
is nothing left on which an assessment of damages can be predi-
cated ;25 that the husband, by the statutory whittling down of his
common law rights over his wife, is reduced to a position of equality
with her in this regard, and that if she has no right to recover for a
negligent injury to the husband which results in the loss of consor-
tium, he has no greater right in a case where she has been negligently
injured. As it is put in a recent case, "The law will not attempt to
fix pecuniary compensation in favor of the husband for the indirect
effect which the wife's injuries may have had upon the sentimental
side of the consortium.
' '26
The Married Women's Acts have therefore produced the follow-
ing results: the wife is almost everywhere given a right to sue for
intentional interference with the consortium, as by alienation of
affection, crim. con., sale of incapacitating drugs, etc., but she is
denied a right to sue for loss of consortium resulting from negligent
injuryto the husband; the husband retains his common law right to
sue for alienation of affections and for crim. con., but cannot recover
for the diminution of the wife's ability to earn money, though he can
still recover, in most jurisdictions, for her diminished capacity to
work in the household. As to his right, clearly recognized and pro-
23 Blair v. Seitner Co. (1915), i84 Mich. 304.
24Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry. (i916), 78 N. H. 289, in which many
authorities are collected.
25 Bolger v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co. (19xo), 205 Mass. 42o; Marri v. Stam-
ford St. Ry. Co. (Ig1), 84 Conn. 9; Blair v. Seitner Co., supra; Golden v. R.
L. Greene Paper Co. (1922), - R. I. -, 16 Atl. 579.
26 Golden v. R. L. Greene Paper Co., supra. In this case the injury to the
sentimental side of the consortium consisted in the wife's lessened capacity for
sexual intercourse.
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tected at common law, to recover for the loss of her society, the
clear weight of authority is that he retains this right of action,
though a few courts, impressed by the fact that the wife is consist-
ently denied such right and by the desirability of putting husband
and wife on a basis of equality in law, have held that the husband
no longer has this right.
The insistence on equality between the spouses is certainly justi-
fied, in view of the present public opinion, and such equality is cer-
tainly the end toward which the Married Women's Acts tend. But
can it not be attained better by giving the right to the wife than by
taking it away from the husband? Only one court has had the cour-
age to take this step. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
Hipp v. Dupont & Co.,27 held that a wife had a right of action for
loss of consortium arising out of injuries suffered by the husband
because of defendant's negligence. The court considered the various
reasons which have persuaded other courts to deny such a right to
the wife, and held that they no longer existed, because of the Mar-
ried Women's Acts, or that they were not valid.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion reached by the North Caro-
lina court. The husband's right to consortium at common law was
protected from injury, either intentional or unintentional, and it is
still protected in all cases by the great weight of authority, even since
the Married Women's Acts. Why should the right of the wife be
restricted to cases in which there is intentional interference by the
defendant, while the husband is given the right, regardless of intent?
We cannot properly invoke the principle which gives a right of action
for an act done malevolently when no right of action would exist
if the act were done without malice, for in cases of crim. con. and of
alienation of affections there is never that active malevolence toward
the plaintiff which is made the gist of the right of action. Nor is it at
plaintiff which is made the gist of the right of action. Nor is it at
all clear that the danger feared by Dean Pound2s as to double recov-
ery is any more apparent here than in many other cases. In many
cases of injury to one spouse, the other spouse unmistakably suffers
individual loss; a sick, lame, nervous spouse is less desirable as a
companion than a spouse in normal physical condition. Perhaps the
27 (1921) i82 N. C. 9. A note in 35 HAzv. L. Rzv. upholds the decision
of the court.
28 See note 21, supra.
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injury is one that is difficult to measure in pecuniary terms, but it
undoubtedly is a real injury, and can certainly be as accurately meas-
-ured as the injuries in cases of alienation of affection. Certainly
there has been no bad result from allowing the husband to sue in
such cases, and it seems better to allow the action to the wife as well,
rather than to take it away from the husband merely because of a
desire to make the law symmetrical.
It seems likely that the principle of equality between the-spouses
will gain increasing recognition by the courts, but of course it is too
early even to guess whether the view of the North Carolina court or
that of the New England courts will predominate. In any event, it
is clear that another change is being made in the meaning of "con-
sortium."
